The explosive popularity of tablets, smartphones and other Internet-connected consumer devices has ushered in a new technology ecosystem driven by Apps. These self-contained software programs have not only provided the stakeholders involved with a compelling way to exploit everything from movies and games to magazines and newspapers, but have created a thriving new marketplace poised for ongoing, accelerated growth. While the stakeholders are many, the myriad of complex business and legal issues facing them are no less staggering in number. For publishers, content creators, App developers, content distributors, aggregators, storefront operators and service providers, the successful navigation of a rapidly evolving landscape of shifting terms and conditions, privacy regulations, content restrictions and corresponding business considerations across multiple devices and platforms has proven a daunting but essential exercise for leveraging the economic opportunities available.

In this CLE-accredited webinar, the DigitalHHR team will explore the critical business and legal challenges associated with the development, publication, distribution, sale and use of Apps. We will discuss the contours of in-App purchases, subscription-based offerings, and “freemium” models, as well as in-App advertising and App-based ad networks. We will analyze the evolving privacy terms and conditions associated with the use of Apps, and the corresponding laws, regulations and case law impacting end user data collection, disclosure and ownership. We will also address the terms and requirements promulgated by the various platform operators, including Apple, RIM (Blackberry) and Google (Android), and how they impact stakeholders’ participation across the different App environments.

The webinar will be held on Thursday, April 7, 2011 from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. EDT.

To register, please click here.

In October 2009, the France’ high court approved “Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur Internet”, or “HADOPI” (see our previous post: Three Strikes and You’re…OUTTTT! (Of French Cyberspace)).  Now almost one year into the life of the law, results have been mixed. The French government has said that it is prepared to begin issuing warnings and sanctions under the law, but no action has been taken yet. Commentators have questioned the feasibility of the law (e.g., the ease with which offenders can regain access to the Internet), and some original supporters of the legislation have qualified their original support of the law in response to adverse political reaction.

The U.K.’s Digital Economy Act  was enacted on June 8, 2010. Aimed at regulating the access of copyrighted material by end-users, one controversial section of the law establishes a system for identifying users who access illegal materials and for gradually increasing technical restrictions on their Internet access. These restrictions involve initially downgrading the quality of a user’s connection (the hope being that slower upload and download speeds will act as a deterrent to piracy) and culminate in a complete denial of Internet access.

Since the enactment of the DEA, the Office of Communication (Ofcom), an independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries, has developed a protocol/obligations codefor implementing the legislation (but has said that plans to disconnect end-users from the Internet would not come into force until next year). ISPs are tasked with identifying and compiling a list of those end-users believed to be engaging in infringing conduct via a three-stage notification process, which includes sending letters to such end-users (which must include certain “standardized” information in connection with the allegations made against the end-user and what actions such end-user can take both to challenge the allegation and to protect their network). Rights’ holders can also request the ISP to identify those end-users who have breached an Ofcom-defined threshold for continued violation of access to information (i.e., following the third notification to a particular end-user), after which the rights’ holder may petition a court for identification of the user for purposes of initiating litigation.

Not surprisingly, the DEA has been subject to criticism from many perspectives.  Certain commentators have claimed that the complete denial of Internet service may violate existing European Union principles and regulations intended to preserve EU residents’ “basic rights and freedoms”, one of which is the right to access and use the Internet, and say that even worse is the manner in which the act was passed into law (which ISPs claim was rushed through Parliament with insufficient scrutiny). Further criticism focuses on the fact that the DEA provides only for an independent, limited appeals process for end-users who believe they have been wrongly accused of copyright infringement (as opposed to due process in a judicial proceeding). Consumer rights groups have raised concerns that an innocent user who has not encrypted her wireless network may be sanctioned if others access the network to engage in authorized conduct.  In addition, some have predicted that the threat of disconnection may alienate the most avid legalbuyers of entertainment content, encouraging them to switch to anonymized, encrypted alternatives so as not to reveal their identity.  Lastly, because the DEA only applies to ISPs with more than 400,000 customers, one consequenceof the law could be a flight of consumers to smaller ISPs, placing the larger ISPs at a commercial disadvantage.

Many major ISPs have recently spoken out against the DEA.  TalkTalk and British Telecom (the UK’s largest providers of broadband to homes) have initiated legal challenges, with their core claim being that the DEA conflicts with existing European Union regulations relating to individual privacy and electronics communications directives, as well as e-commerce directives.  They have also raised concerns about the role of ISPs in policing the Internet (i.e., that ISP’s are mere conduits of content and should not be held responsible for traffic on their services). 

Many reporters and commentators have also started to speculate about the practical ramifications of the DEA.  These include concerns that the increased costs borne by ISPs in identifying and notifying infringing users may be passed onto subscribers, raising access costs across the board.  Additionally, there is speculation that additional taxesmay be imposed on ISPs for transmission of pirated content by their subscribers.  Finally, the potential ramifications of long-term end-user tracking (e.g., data retention issues) have raised additional privacy concerns.

Reception of the three-strikes legislation, or graduated response, has been mixed elsewhere in the European Union and around the world.  In some countries, such as Belgium and Singapore, active or proposed legislation has tried to establish administrative oversight of illegal access to copyrighted material. In others, such as Germany, the government has taken a more laissez-faire approach by asking individual ISPs to handle content regulation and restriction without active government intervention.  

The point of restriction of content access varies as well. Graduated response, such as the process promulgated by HADOPI, puts the onus upon the individual end-user (i.e., if the end-user infringes upon copyright and accesses copyrighted material, she suffers the potential sanction of denial of Internet service). In other proposals, this remedy is rejected in favor of putting the burden on ISPs: the service provider must actively block websites known to provide copyrighted material illegally. Yet other proposed regulations include targeting the website itself and have imposed (or have tried to impose) sanctions against individual websites for their presence within a certain country.

These alternate approaches clearly reveal the competing, deeply-rooted political philosophies and interests engaged in the debate.  Is digital piracy something that should be primarily policed by the government through stringent regulatory schemes?  Or should the responsibility fall to commercial stakeholders, such as content owners and ISPs?  How does one resolve the competing interests between content owners (who seek the most stringent protections available) and ISPs (who may view themselves as a passive provider of a basic service, not an active enforcement agency)?  And will innocent end-users find that they are adversely impacted by the actions of true infringers?

While there may be universal agreement that infringing activity must be inhibited, it is unlikely that a single, unified approach to the problem will emerge any time soon.  However, through trial and error and the experience of “early adapter” nations such as France and the UK, it is possible that a consensus will emerge on a scheme that achieves a balance among the concerns and interests of the various stakeholders.

We will obviously keep an eye on future developments in this area of the law and relevant industry practices.

When it initially purchased Skype, eBay attempted to purchase Joltid as well but Friis and Zennstrom refused to sell, wanting instead to retain the intellectual property rights in GI.  They also refused to sell or directly license the GI source code to eBay.  eBay therefore purchased Skype subject to a license agreement for the GI code between Skype and Joltid.  That decision appears to be coming back to haunt eBay.

According to Friis and Zennstrom, the license agreement granted Skype the right to use an executable-only form of the GI code, known as the object code, which is un-editable.  Skype did not obtain any rights or license to the source code of the GI software.  This arrangement worked so long as Friis and Zennstrom remained with Skype because they were authorized to use and tinker with the GI source code.  However after their departure in 2007, Friis and Zennstrom began challenging eBay’s use of the GI technology, claiming that Skype (at that point owned by eBay) obtained unauthorized versions of the GI source code and breached the terms of its licensing agreement by continuing to modify and create derivatives of the source code.

In March of this year, Skype filed a claim in a U.K. court asking for declaratory relief and a finding that it is lawfully accessing, in possession of, using and modifying the GI code in accordance with the terms of the agreement.  Joltid disagreed, terminated the license agreement and filed defenses and counterclaims against Skype alleging that Skype had repudiated the license agreement, infringed upon Joltid’s copyright, and misused confidential information.  The case is scheduled for trial in June 2010.

A few weeks ago, Friis and Zennstrom opened another front in the dispute by filing a lawsuit in Northern California U.S. District Court against eBay that also names the investors as defendants.  These investors include private-equity firm Silver Lake, venture-capital firms Index Ventures and Andreesen Horowitz and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board.  The suit claims that the investors were aware of Skype’s copyright violations during negotiations of the deal and seeks an injunction on Skype’s use of the GI technology in addition to damages and profits that Skype has made while using the technology in breach of its license. Such damages are allegedly “amassing at a rate of more than $75 million daily”.  The pair also filed another lawsuit shortly after which alleges that new software being developed by Skype incorporated confidential information that was misappropriated by a former executive at one of Friis and Zennstrom’s companies who recently joined Index Ventures, part of the investor group paying $1.9 billion for Skype.

With the benefit of hindsight, many have wondered why eBay would have paid $2.6 billion for Skype without better securing rights to its underlying technology in a manner that would not be interrupted.  While the precise reasons eBay structured the deal in this manner may not be clear, the opportunities it missed to protect itself are apparent.

First, by allowing Joltid to retain rights to the GI code, eBay’s use of the code was subject to the restrictions and limitations that Joltid and Friis and Zennstrom placed on such use as set forth in the license agreement. 

Additionally, without obtaining rights to the source code, eBay was at the mercy of Friis and Zennstrom, the two individuals who understood how the GI code functioned.  While eBay likely felt that having Friis and Zennstrom on its payroll would mitigate any concerns, perhaps additional thought should have been given to what would transpire if and when Friis and Zennstrom were no longer affiliated with eBay.

eBay also apparently did not acquire sufficiently clear rights to develop derivatives and modifications of the GI technology.  Therefore, any next generation versions of the GI technology that eBay wished to develop would have been subject to the restrictions of the original license agreement, including the rights that Joltid, Friis and Zennstrom had in the technology and source code.

While the intrigue and tangled nature of this dispute are in many ways unique, the lesson is clear: the treatment of IP rights in an M&A transaction involves consideration of multiple factors, contingencies and interests.  Careful and deliberate analysis of possible future scenarios–however likely or unlikely–is necessary to avoid losing the competitive advantage that is one of the foundations of the underlying transaction.

The statute at issue is a 2005 California law that would prevent minors from renting or purchasing violent video games that depict serious injury to human beings in a manner that is “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved.”  Retailers who rent or sell such games in violation of the act would face a maximum fine of $1,000 for each violation.

Shortly after this law was enacted, its constitutionality was challenged by the Video Software Dealers Association and the Entertainment Software Association, two trade associations that represent companies in the video game industry.  The groups argued that video games are protected speech under the First Amendment and that the act constituted an impermissible restriction on such speech. The district court agreed with these arguments, holding that the law was unconstitutional and granting a permanent injunction against its enforcement. 

While it is difficult to predict how the Ninth Circuit will rule on this issue, the Eighth Circuit recently addressed the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute functionally similar to the challenged California law.  (Interestingly enough, the Entertainment Software Association was a party in that case as well.)  In that case, the court found that video games are a form of protected speech, comparable to literature and film.  Because the regulations were content-based, focusing on the presence of violent themes and imagery, the court reviewed the legislation under a “strict scrutiny” standard.  To be upheld under this standard of review, the law needs to be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling interest.”

Since the Supreme Court has held that the psychological well-being of children qualifies as a “compelling interest”, the Eighth Circuit found that element satisfied.  The decision therefore focused on whether the legislation was “narrowly tailored,” a question that involved both the breadth of the legislation and its causal connection to the aforementioned goal.  As was the case in the California district court decision, the Eighth Circuit found that the statutory language did not effectively isolate troubling content and that the scientific link between violent video games and psychological harm to children lacked sufficient proof.  Consequently, the Eighth Circuit found the regulation to be unconstitutional.

If the Ninth Circuit follows the precedent set forth by the Eighth Circuit, regulators will have a difficult time tailoring legislation to meet this stringent standard.  On the other hand, if the court finds all or portions of these regulations permissible, software developers may feel compelled to curtail particular forms of violence in video games and retailers may need to alter their current sales and rental practices.  While this decision may provide temporary clarity to the industry and regulators, these constitutional issues will not be definitively resolved until they reach the Supreme Court.