The program enables individuals and companies to register a Facebook URL with an address format of www.facebook.com/[username].  Applicant for usernames are generally allowed to choose them freely, without need to prove any connection or ownership to the name itself.  This wide-open nature raises potential concerns for intellectual property rights holders, particularly trademark owners, worried about unauthorized use of their trademarks in connection with the service. 

Facebook has sought to maintain as much of control over the usernames as possible, including the right to remove or reclaim a username at any time for any reason.  This strong proactive stance is probably partially motivated by a desire to preempt and prevent widespread buying or selling of usernames, and the cyber-squatting practices that follow.  (Such concerns are not unfounded; Facebook usernames are already up for sale on Assetize, an online website specializing in the buying and selling of online accounts.)

But back to the ownership issue–Can Facebook actually “own” a username that contains a registered and widely used trademark owned by someone else?  And if Facebook “owns” the username, what happens when a trademark owner seeks to register the username containing its mark?  Is “ownership” (i.e., title) to the username conveyed?  Or does Facebook license the username?  Take for example the username “facebook.com/burgerking”.  As of the date of this posting, Burger King has not yet registered the username, but if it does choose to register it, is it accurate to say that Facebook is transferring ownership over the username to Burger King?  Or is it licensing it?  Either way, how can Facebook transfer to Burger King something Burger King already owns?

Also, Facebook claims that when a Facebook account is cancelled, that account’s username will not become available to anyone else.  If Burger King registers for the user name, and then cancels it, can Facebook prevent Burger King from re-registering the user name if it later changes its mind?  In the end it is not clear or likely that Facebook can legitimately assert power over trademark holders when it comes to the use of their trademarks in the Usernames program. 

Facebook’s terms of service do not help to clarify the matter.  They make no mention of the Usernames program.  On the other hand, Facebook’s “Help Center” does have a section devoted to answering common questions about the program.  When the program was launched, the Help Center materials contained a few scant paragraphs of information.  Since that time, it has become much more developed, but that initial lack of clarity exemplifies the legal ambiguity with which the initiative got off the ground.  The uncertainties surrounding the Usernames program may be of particular concern for businesses in light of their increasing reliance on Facebook as an avenue through which to connect with customers (and concerns about businesses’ dependence on Facebook are not new).

We will eventually see if Facebook’s experience with the Usernames program proves a cautionary tale as to the pitfalls of rolling out new programs without fully anticipating the potential legal issues.  As the Username feature develops and more companies become aware of it, Facebook may see both disputes and angry markholders multiply. 

This may turn into yet another cyber-battleground over trademarks.  Numerous trademark infringement claims have been brought against Google in connection with its search ad business.  The claims are based on Google’s sale of trademarked keywords through its AdWords program.  In large part, the plaintiffs have asserted that such sales constitute trademark infringement because consumers could be confused by links to competitors’ ads that pop up alongside a search for the plaintiff’s marks.  While Google suffered a litigation setback in April when the Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of a suit brought by Rescuecom Corp., two separate actions against Google, one by Daniel Jurin and the other by Ascentive LLC, were both recently dismissed.

We will continue to monitor these matters and keep an eye out for developments.  In the meantime, our group would be happy to discuss any specific questions you might have about the impact of Facebook’s Usernames program on your trademark portfolio and help you develop strategies to protect your intellectual property rights.

*  We would like to thank Yoshinori Sasao, a summer associate at the Firm, who assisted in preparing this article.

The tremendous effectiveness of video game product placement and in-game sponsorship is no surprise, with gamers maintaining high and sustained exposure to advertisements. A recent study revealed that gaming audiences are more inclined to remember and positively perceive brands featured inside video games than other advertisements and that this form of advertising is even beginning to trump the effectiveness of television advertisements. Another similar study found that, unlike advertising messages in other media, advertising in video games is seen by gamers as making the games feel more authentic and 65% of players agreed that in-game advertisements made the gaming experience feel more realistic and 55% said the advertisements “look cool”.

In this climate, your decision to dress your main video game character in, for example, a pair of Vans (or even kicks resembling Vans) could earn you a thank you note or possibly a temporary restraining order from Vans which may have an exclusive in-game licensing arrangement with Activision Blizzard, the publishers of the Tony Hawk series of skateboarding games. Make no mistake, the major video game developers and publishers are engaged in a well-funded war for market share, and licensing agreements with real-world content owners have become the norm. Whether you’re creating a sports game, a music title or a first person shooter, there is both tremendous promotional value and legitimacy that accompanies the in-game inclusion of popular names, products and places, and the respective owners now want their say as to the games in which they appear and how and under what conditions their content is featured.

Now that content owners have skin in the game (no pun intended, of course), licensing arrangements are being struck left and right–some exclusive, some non-exclusive, some royalty bearing, some royalty free. From guitar makers to gun manufactures, content owners know that placing, for example, a “Smith & Wesson” gun in the main character’s hands, as opposed to an “ACME” rifle, has the potential to sway consumers inundated with options, especially in the already crowded first person shooter genre, from one title to another. With  in-game asset licensing arrangements becoming more and more common, the traditional test for assessing trademark infringement as it relates to video games—the likelihood of confusion among consumers as to whether the assets being depicted in the video game are endorsed or associated with the title—has and will continue to be an easier hurdle for trademark owners to clear as the amount of licensing agreements pertaining to inclusion of trademarked or copyrighted works in video games increases. In other words, circumventing the licensing process in favor of a “fair use” or First Amendment defense will no longer be a viable position from a risk assessment perspective, as plaintiffs will now have an easier time demonstrating and establishing that in-game licensing arrangements have become industry standard and convey substantial commercial value.

This will be the first of many posts to come on the subject of video game licensing and clearances, as well as the legal principles and case law underlying the topic, including fair use and infringement (both for copyright and trademark) and the building blocks of the licensing agreements required to navigate the interactive gaming space.

Tomorrow a Swedish court is expected to announce it’s ruling in a criminal case that has been closely watched by nearly everyone with a stake-financial or otherwise-in the free-wheeling world of P2P file swapping.  At its core, the ruling will determine whether the operators of the Pirate Bay, the popular torrent search and indexing site, are guilty of violating Sweden’s copyright law.  A conviction-which many observers expect-could lead to imprisonment and a possible fine, as well as a shut-down of the site.  However, despite the potential immediate impact on the Pirate Bay and its operators, the broader implications of a guilty verdict, including whether or not it will serve as a deterrent against unauthorized file-sharing, are a little less certain.

For the uninitiated, a little background:  the Pirate Bay is a Swedish web site that bills itself as the world’s largest BitTorrent tracker.  According to various measurements, the site ranked 105th for daily traffic over the past three months and an estimated 2.7 million people from the US visit every month.  

BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol used to transfer files, which accounts for approximately 35% of all traffic on the Internet according to one study.  BitTorrent differs from traditional P2P file-sharing in that a single file may be downloaded from numerous sources, each providing small packets of data, rather than from a single source.  A client implementing the protocol creates a small file called a “torrent” which contains metadata about the files to be shared and about a tracker computer that coordinates file distribution.  A user seeking to download the file must first obtain the torrent file associated with it and connect to the tracker computer, which then tells the user’s computer which other computers on the network have pieces of the file to be downloaded.

The defendants in the Pirate Bay case are relying on the underlying nature of the BitTorrent protocol to serve as the basis for their defense.  Specifically, they claim that since the Pirate Bay website only serves as an index for torrent files, and does not actually store any copyrighted materials, the site’s operations cannot be deemed to be infringing.  Taking the argument a bit further, they claim that because many sites and services on the Web point to or link to infringing content or allow users to upload such content-including Google-the infrastructure and inherent nature of the Internet are at issue in the case.  The defendants used the analogy of roads and telephones that sometimes are used for illegal activities: no one suggests destroying the road network or hauling phone companies into court due to offenses committed by one or more individuals using such roads or telephones.

Prosecutors countered that search services like Google, and the roads and telephone lines, were established to foster legal activities.  In contrast, the Pirate Bay’s entire raison d’être appears to be to foster primarily illegal activity in the form of infringing file-sharing. 

The trial itself, which was held over three weeks in February and March, was a bit of circus.  The defendants and their supporters posted daily accounts of the trial on the Web.  And, after the web site of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, the trade group for the music industry, was hacked during the trial, one of the defendants posted a note on his Twitter account saying, “Whoever is hacking the IFPI websites, please stop doing that.  It only makes us look bad!”

In many ways, the Pirate Bay’s notoriety is an “only in Sweden” affair.  Until recent amendments, the Swedish copyright law did not prohibit downloading copyrighted material for personal use.  Nearly every Swedish household has a cheap broadband connection, and polls have found that over 10% of the population engaged in some sort of P2P file-sharing and downloading.  A political party dedicated to legalizing P2P file sharing-regardless of copyright issues-was formed and has made credible efforts to gain seats in the Swedish Parliament.

However, in response to international pressure, the Swedish government has begun to take a tougher stance against illegal file-sharing.  Earlier this month, a law came into effect allowing content owners to obtain from Swedish ISPs the names and addresses of people suspected of sharing copyrighted materials without authorization.  The law, which brings to Sweden an investigation and enforcement tool available throughout the EU, had an immediate impact. On the day the law went into effect, total Internet usage decreased by 40% and has remained suppressed since such time.

During the trial, the head of the IFPI testified that 30% of the losses suffered by the global music industry were a result of illegal file sharing, citing several academic papers.  He also testified that, following successful court actions in recent years which led to the shut-down of P2P file-sharing sites Grokster and Kazaa, the Pirate Bay had become the No. 1 source for illegal music on the Web. 

Despite the fact that early in the trial prosecutors dropped charges alleging that the operators were “assisting copyright infringement”-leaving the primary allegation based on “assisting in making available” copyrighted material-it appears that the prosecution will ultimately prevail. 

However, it is unclear what impact, if any, shutting down the Pirate Bay will have on illegal file-sharing as a whole.  As has been seen numerous times over the past decade, every time a prominent P2P site or service has been successfully challenged and shut down (see Napster, Kazaa, Grokster, etc.), downloaders have simply found other sites to use.  Moreover, the Pirate Bay is merely one of many BitTorrent search and tracking services currently available to end users, including Mininova, isoHunt and btjunkie.  (Ironically, while none of these sites have become a high-profile target of the entertainment industry, Mininova actually has a higher traffic ranking than the Pirate Bay (86^th v. 105^th).  And the others aren’t shy about self-promotion:  isoHunt says it is the “most comprehensive BitTorrent search engine”; and btjunkie bills itself as “the largest and most advanced BitTorrent search engine” with over 1.5 million active torrents.)  [As an aside, in researching the information above and merely visiting the home pages of those sites via Google links, the PC we were using was apparently infected with a virus (notwithstanding the fairly extensive systems in place here).  Perhaps the media industry's strategy vis a vis these sites is based on its awareness of this "deterrent" we unwittingly and regretfully stumbled upon.]

However, in light of the brazen attitude that the Pirate Bay’s operators have taken toward illegal file-sharing, a conviction will enable the entertainment industry to claim a major victory in its fight against Internet piracy.

Regardless of the outcome, the trial-and similar enforcement efforts-should not be viewed by the entertainment and media industry as a substitute for a viable P2P business strategy.  Current and future technologies are making the digital distribution of music, video and book files faster, simpler and more ubiquitous.  Initiatives such as collective licensing-under which ISPs would pay an independent agency a fee based on its user base (presumably passed on as a fee to the users), which would in turn be pooled by the agency and used to pay royalties to content owners-are being considered viable alternatives that may effectively compensate content owners, foster the wide distribution of entertainment assets and move the digital space to a less adversarial environment.

Mr. Siegel is nationally recognized as a leader in matters involving the convergence of technology and entertainment and the delivery and exploitation of content through new technologies, media and platforms. His combined expertise in the core fields of entertainment, technology, media and communications, and intellectual property have given him an interdisciplinary perspective and a unique ability to structure business relationships, models, and transactions and provide comprehensive legal and business counseling in this complex and cutting edge area. Specific technologies and applications that Mr. Siegel has been involved with (on behalf of both content and technology companies) include the digital cinema projection, CGI animation, video on demand and electronic sell-through, high definition DVD, satellite and wireless delivery, peer-to-peer distribution, digital cable, digital video recorders, cellular phones, interactive television, fiber-optic transmission, and other digital and analog applications.

In addition, Mr. Siegel has been involved in legal matters and transactions relating to the Internet since the early 1990s, making him one of the most experienced and knowledgeable attorneys practicing in this area. He has represented a number of the primary players in the Internet sector, including ISPs and portals, e-commerce companies, infrastructure and equipment companies, and content and entertainment providers, as well as numerous start-up and emerging growth companies. Transactional matters handled by Mr. Siegel for Internet clients include venture capital financings, strategic alliances and joint ventures, cross-marketing and interactive marketing deals, linking agreements, carriage and distribution arrangements, technology and website development agreements, content and technology licenses, e-commerce agreements, counseling relating to privacy issues, user generated content and social networking, and numerous other matters.

In addition to his work in the area of technology/entertainment convergence and the Internet, Mr. Siegel continues to practice actively in his sub-specialty areas of entertainment, technology, media and communications, and intellectual property.

In traditional entertainment, for over 25 years, Mr. Siegel has represented motion picture and television production companies, studios, networks and distributors, investors and financiers, and other parties in connection with development, production and services agreements, rights acquisitions and clearances, licensing and distribution arrangements, output agreements, co-productions, financing transactions, joint ventures, library acquisitions and sales, commercial tie-ins, output agreements, housekeeping deals, workout transactions, special effects, and other matters. He also has extensive experience in related areas such as book publishing, merchandising, music publishing, computer and video games, and other interactive software products.

Mr. Siegel’s experience in technology transactions includes numerous software development and licensing agreements, reseller and distribution agreements (e.g., OEM, VAR, and sales rep. agreements), technology development agreements, joint ventures and strategic alliances, manufacturing and supply agreements, patent and trademark licensing, outsourcing transactions, technology procurement agreements, service and maintenance agreements, technology transfers, beta test agreements, open source development arrangements, and other technology transactions.

In media and communications, Mr. Siegel has represented MSO cable and satellite operators and broadcasters and programming services, in connection with programming acquisitions, carriage and affiliation agreements, cable franchise acquisitions and transfers, system swaps, transponder leases, mergers and acquisitions, financing transactions, and other matters. He has also worked on various matters and projects in the telecommunications field such as agreements for the construction and operation of high-speed communications infrastructures and networks, satellite carriage of communications signals, telecommunications services agreements, interconnection and networking agreements, hosting agreements, fiber-optic leases and easements, financing transactions, and other matters.

Throughout all of these practice areas, Mr. Siegel has developed a thorough understanding of copyright, trademark, trade secret and other intellectual property laws. He is frequently involved in licensing and other transactional matters relating to intellectual property, as well as general counseling regarding intellectual property matters and issues.

Publications

• “The Use and Advantages of Arbitration in International Commercial Contracts,” Inside the Minds: International Trade Legal Strategies, published by Aspatore Books, 2007.
• “Mobile Phone Ring Tones – Digital Technology Once Again Pushes the Envelope of Copyright Law,” IP New Matter, Volume 28. No. 1, September 2003.
• “U.S. Privacy Standards and Practices,” published by Law Seminars International, November 2001.
• “The Scope and Implications of Internet Privacy,” International Bar Association publication, July 2000.
• Various Articles, Handbook on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts, published by Clark Boardman Callaghan (1997 edition).
• “Net Losses” (discussing copyright infringement on the Internet), California Law Business, February 1996.
• “Incorporation of Pre-Existing Content in Multimedia Products,” California Law Business, September 1996.

 Lectures and Seminars

• The Changing Landscape of Film and Television Distribution in the Global Arena: Thinking Outside the Proverbial Box, presentation at Beverly Hills Bar Association symposium, November 2008 (Beverly Hills, California).
• Negotiating Talent Deals: New World and Old World Templates, presentation and panel moderator at the 50th Anniversary Institute on Entertainment Law and Business of the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, October 2008 (Los Angeles, California).
• Rights Clearance: Recent Decisions and Case Law, presentation at 22nd Annual Conference on International Audiovisual Law, International Chamber of Commerce, May 2008 (Cannes, France).
• Reality TV – Unique Legal Issues, presentation at Film and Television Law Conference, CLE International, October 2007 (Los Angeles, California).
• The Legalities of Reality TV, presentation at Film and Television Law Conference, CLE International, June 2005 (Los Angeles, California).
• Co-Chair, Conference on IT Governance, International Bar Association Convention, October 2004 (Auckland, New Zealand).
• Electronic Records Management, presentation at International Bar Association Convention, October 2004 (Auckland, New Zealand).
• Reality TV – Unique Legal Issues, presentation at Film and Television Law Conference, CLE International, June 2004 (Los Angeles, California).
• IP Issues in Structuring Deals and Drafting Agreements, Continuing Education of the Bar Seminar, May 2003 (Irvine, California – also presented in Los Angeles, California).
• Internet Piracy, presentation at LegalTech LA Conference, May 2003 (Los Angeles, California).
• Protecting Rights in the Digital Economy, presentation at Conference on High Technology and the Emerging Digital Economy, International Bar Association, October 2002 (Los Angeles, California).
• Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Law, presentation at FBI-Intragard Meeting, October 2002 (Los Angeles, California).
• Challenges Posed by Peer-to-Peer Distribution, presentation at International Bar Association Convention, October 2002 (Durban, South Africa).
• US Privacy Laws, presentation at Computer Law Conference, Law Seminars International, November 2001 (Seattle, Washington).
• Essential Motion Picture Agreements, presentation at Entertainment Law Symposium, Law Seminars International, August 2001 (Los Angeles, California).
• Internet Privacy Issues, presentation at International Bar Association Convention, October 2000 (Amsterdam, The Netherlands).
• Digital Distribution of Content, presentation at International Bar Association Convention, October 2000 (Amsterdam, The Netherlands).
• Protective Provisions for Cross-Border Licensing Transactions, presentation to divisions of Viacom, Inc., February 2000 (Los Angeles, California).
• Privacy Issues, presentation at Computer Law Conference, Law Seminars International, July 1999 (Los Angeles, California).
• Legal Issues Affecting New Media, panelist, LA County Bar Association Forum, August 1998 (Los Angeles, California).
• Protection of Content on the Internet, presentation at Internet and Digital Television Summit: The New Deal, January 1997 (Paris, France).
• The Internet and World Wide Web, presentation before Japanese Executives Society, June 1996 (Dana Point, California).
• Use of Motion Pictures as Collateral for Secured Loans, presentation before Entertainment Lenders Society, April 1995 (Los Angeles, California).

Education

• Stanford University, B.A., 1980, highest honors, Phi Beta Kappa
• University of Chicago Law School, J.D., 1984, highest honors, Order of the Coif, Member of the University of Chicago Law Review

Bar Admissions

• California, 1984

As we discussed in a previous post, Lenz, in her suit against Universal, is asserting a claim of “misrepresentation” under Section 512(f) of the DMCA, which states that

“Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section that material or activity is infringing…shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer… who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing…”

Lenz’s misrepresentation claim, therefore, could be sustained only if Universal failed to comply with the takedown requirements under Section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) which states that any copyright holder filing a takedown notice must have “a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”

In response to Lenz’s suit, Universal filed a motion to dismiss claiming that copyright owners cannot be required to evaluate the question of fair use prior to sending a takedown notice because fair use is merely an excused infringement of copyright rather than a use authorized by the copyright holder or by law. In other words, the “good faith” requirement under Section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) does not apply because fair use is not a use authorized by law. Lenz (supported by lawyers from the Electronic Frontier Foundation), countered that fair use is, in fact, an authorized use of copyrighted material and that copyright holders cannot represent in good faith under the DMCA that content infringes copyright as required without considering all authorized uses of such content, including fair use.

In August, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, rejected Universal’s motion to dismiss and held that the Copyright Act provides explicitly that “the fair use of a copyrighted work…is not an infringement of copyright” and that fair use is lawful use of copyright. Accordingly, the court held that Section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) applies to fair use of a copyright and therefore Universal could be held liable on a claim of misrepresentation if Lenz can prove the requisite standard of subjective bad faith necessary to prevail.

While the impact of this decision is not yet clear (as it is merely a dismissal of a motion that allows the case to proceed), copyright holders need to proceed with caution in their approach to issuing takedown notices. If the district court’s initial ruling is upheld, it is possible that copyright holders may be required to consider the potential fair use applications of a copyrighted work before issuing takedown notices and the failure to do so may constitute a violation of the DMCA. In other words, corporations and their intellectual property enforcement regimes will now be tasked with making value judgments on the applicability of the fair use doctrine—one of the most amorphous and continually evolving legal concepts in existence.  

The DMCA was initially intended as the US implementation of two treaties adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1996 to establish rules for two evolving forms of digital media: music and computer software and databases.  However, as the legislation was introduced in Congress, additional provisions were added in response to lobbying efforts by two distinct constituencies.  

Media companies wanted the bill to include provisions to protect their IP, which was increasingly available in digital form, from widespread infringement.  They therefore pressed for the inclusion of anti-circumvention rules that prevent anyone from bypassing any technological measures used by copyright owners to control access to their works.  And ISPs, hosting companies and interactive services sought provisions to provide a safe harbor from infringement claims based on the actions of their users.  In hindsight, these provisions, which were ultimately included in the DMCA, have each impacted the technological landscape in ways that are felt everyday

Without the anti-circumvention provisions, it is unlikely that DVD technology, which was being test marketed when the DMCA was enacted, would have been embraced by movie studios.  The adoption of DVD technology has led to the blossoming of new lines of electronics manufacturing and rental businesses that have far outpaced those which evolved when VHS was the primary medium for home viewing of movies.

However, these same provisions have also led to disputes and litigation that, to some, run counter to their original intent.  For example, while developing and improving methods to ensure the security of the internet and computers connected to it would seem to be an unassailable goal, the anti-circumvention provisions have created a Catch-22 for security experts and researchers.  In order to improve copy-protection systems and computer security programs, these experts and researchers need to determine what flaws exist in any currently deployed security system.  Thus, the very act of testing those systems is a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.  For a more detailed, albeit one-sided, view of this debate, here is the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s report, entitled “Unintended Consequences: Ten Years under the DMCA.”

The safe harbor provisions have enabled the explosive growth of the web, particularly as an interactive medium.  In effect, website operators from MySpace to WordPress were able to provide forums for users without a constant fear of being sued based on the acts of their users.

In order to maintain “safe harbor” protection, the “provider of online services” must meet certain conditions.  It cannot have knowledge of an infringement nor derive any direct financial benefit from the infringing activity where it has the right and ability to control it.  A provider must also expeditiously remove material if a copyright holder sends a take-down notice, without the need to evaluate the notice to determine if it is accurate or whether the user who uploaded the content has any rights to it.   From a simple perspective, this seems to make sense:  a provider should not be put in a position of having to adjudicate disputes over content.  As a pure intermediary, its obligations should be as simple as possible (If receive take-down notice è then take down content).  The principals are the ones with the vested interest in the content and should be the only ones debating the merits of who has the right to make content available.

However, some content owners believe that too much emphasis is being placed on the take-down “remedy” enabling it to serve as a blanket of immunity for all infringement claims.  What if an online provider’s sole business model is to provide users with a readily available means to post content online?  And what if the site becomes wildly popular, with the potential to earn substantial amounts of money selling ads to companies seeking that vast user base and audience? And what if it is clear that users are posting content they don’t own?  Doesn’t the online provider lose its safe harbor protection because it has knowledge of the infringement?  Or is deriving financial benefit from the infringement? 

These are the basic facts underlying Viacom’s lawsuit against Google.  The case is headed for trial next spring.  The outcome will undoubtedly have major repercussions throughout the digital media world.

The intermediary function of online providers has also recently come under assault in a somewhat surprising context, the presidential campaign.  John McCain’s campaign had posted various videos on YouTube that included snippets from broadcast news footage.  In response to take-down notices from the news outlets, YouTube pulled the videos.

The McCain campaign then sent a letter to YouTube claiming its use of the footage was privileged under the fair use doctrine.  While recognizing that a fair use analysis could not be undertaken in response to every take-down notice, the McCain campaign proposed that such an analysis be done, at the very least, when the content at issue was posted by a political campaign.

In response, YouTube, politely, told the McCain campaign “thanks but no thanks.”  In a possible overstatement, the letter said that “[l]awyers and judges constantly disagree about what does and does not constitute fair use.  No number of lawyers could possibly determine with a reasonable level of certainty whether all videos for which we receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair use.”  While acknowledging that some parties abuse the take-down notification process, YouTube essentially passed the burden of policing those abuses to the users who upload the content who, according to YouTube, “operat[e] from a position of strength, with knowledge of exactly where the content in [their] videos came from.”

Ironically, McCain voted for the DMCA.  But YouTube’s response appears to be more in line with both the express language and intent of the safe harbor and take-down notice provisions of the act.

The question of whether a fair use analysis needs to be employed in connection with issuing a take-down notice is currently the subject of litigation involving not an online provider but content owners.  Universal Music and Universal Publishing Group had issued a take-down notice to YouTube over a 29-second video posted by Stephanie Lenz of her toddler dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy.”  YouTube took down the video.  Lenz then sued the Universal entities claiming that they made a misrepresentation in sending the take-down notice to YouTube knowing that Lenz’ use of “Let’s Go Crazy” was not infringing.  In essence, Lenz was arguing that a copyright owner must make a fair use analysis prior to sending a take-down notice to an online provider.

The Universal entities moved to dismiss the complaint.  At issue is language in the DMCA that, when sending a take-down notice, the complaining party must state its good faith belief that the use at issue is “not authorized by the copyright owner.”  Universal argues that fair use is merely an “excused” infringement and therefore a fair use evaluation is not relevant to determine whether the use is “not authorized” for DMCA purposes.  As Universal also pointed out, the DMCA take-down provisions do not even mention fair use, much less place a burden on the party issuing the notice to consider it.

The district court denied the motion, stating that the issue of whether fair use qualifies as “authorized by law” in connection with a take-down notice under the DMCA was a question of first impression. 

Obviously, this is a case that will be closely watched.  However, a final ruling in Lenz’ favor will have considerable consequences, effectively shifting the fair use burden from the user uploading the content (as YouTube noted in its letter to the McCain campaign) to the party issuing the take-down notice, in most cases copyright right owner. 

And so, we usher in the next decade of the DMCA.  And while it is difficult to predict what the next ten years will bring, it is probably safe to say that, regardless of the disputes that will inevitably arise, the digital marketplace will continue to rapidly evolve, with the DMCA serving as the basic framework and foundation for protecting digital rights and the focal point for disputes yet to come.

The Act is actually not a new stand-alone law, but amends several existing intellectual property laws in an effort enhance current enforcement and remedy provisions.  For example, the Act authorizes the government, in connection with a criminal copyright proceeding, to seize any article that may be used to commit or facilitate copyright infringement.   The Act also amends the Lanham (Trademark) Act by doubling statutory damages for counterfeiting to a minimum of $1,000 and a maximum of $200,000 per counterfeit mark, with the willful damage figure doubled to $2,000,000 per mark.  In addition, the Act amends the Computer Crime Enforcement Act to allow expand the scope of grants made by the federal government for computer crimes to also be used for training, prevention, enforcement and prosecution of IP theft and infringement crimes.  

Perhaps the most groundbreaking element of the Act was the creation of new, cabinet-level position, the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator.  This IP Czar is charged with heading an interagency intellectual property enforcement advisory committee (also newly-created by the Act) and coordinating the development and implementation of a “Joint Strategic Plan” against counterfeiting and piracy, which will focus on, among other things, reducing counterfeit and infringing goods in the domestic and international supply chain and disrupting and eliminating domestic and international counterfeiting networks.  The first IP Czar will likely not be appointed until the next administration takes office in January 2009, thus it is too early to determine precisely how he/she might implement the newly created enforcement role and what shape the Joint Strategic Plan might take. 

The Pro-IP Act is certainly a victory for the many groups that lobbied for its passage, including the entertainment/film industry, the recording industry, and major media companies fighting against the pervasiveness of digital piracy.    However, some public advocacy groups opposed the new law, stating that its penalties are far too harsh and that it does not balance consumers’ rights and concerns over those of major media and software companies. In addition, critics of the Pro-IP Act have argued that the bill risks punishing people who have not committed copyright infringement, citing provisions in the Act that authorize the seizure of all computers and compatible devices from a home if a single, pirated MP3 was discovered on just one of the devices.
Ultimately, the passage of this bill sends the U.S. and the world a message that intellectual property infringement and piracy is at the forefront of the U.S. federal government’s focus and will be heavily scrutinized going forward.  And while the focus of the Act was enhancing IP criminal law enforcement and crime prevention, it is clear that content owners and other stakeholders in the digital media industry will be closely eyeing the government’s initiatives in order to ensure that their own efforts to protect and secure their digital assets are done in a manner to best leverage the newly-expanded protections provided in the Act.