When it initially purchased Skype, eBay attempted to purchase Joltid as well but Friis and Zennstrom refused to sell, wanting instead to retain the intellectual property rights in GI.  They also refused to sell or directly license the GI source code to eBay.  eBay therefore purchased Skype subject to a license agreement for the GI code between Skype and Joltid.  That decision appears to be coming back to haunt eBay.

According to Friis and Zennstrom, the license agreement granted Skype the right to use an executable-only form of the GI code, known as the object code, which is un-editable.  Skype did not obtain any rights or license to the source code of the GI software.  This arrangement worked so long as Friis and Zennstrom remained with Skype because they were authorized to use and tinker with the GI source code.  However after their departure in 2007, Friis and Zennstrom began challenging eBay’s use of the GI technology, claiming that Skype (at that point owned by eBay) obtained unauthorized versions of the GI source code and breached the terms of its licensing agreement by continuing to modify and create derivatives of the source code.

In March of this year, Skype filed a claim in a U.K. court asking for declaratory relief and a finding that it is lawfully accessing, in possession of, using and modifying the GI code in accordance with the terms of the agreement.  Joltid disagreed, terminated the license agreement and filed defenses and counterclaims against Skype alleging that Skype had repudiated the license agreement, infringed upon Joltid’s copyright, and misused confidential information.  The case is scheduled for trial in June 2010.

A few weeks ago, Friis and Zennstrom opened another front in the dispute by filing a lawsuit in Northern California U.S. District Court against eBay that also names the investors as defendants.  These investors include private-equity firm Silver Lake, venture-capital firms Index Ventures and Andreesen Horowitz and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board.  The suit claims that the investors were aware of Skype’s copyright violations during negotiations of the deal and seeks an injunction on Skype’s use of the GI technology in addition to damages and profits that Skype has made while using the technology in breach of its license. Such damages are allegedly “amassing at a rate of more than $75 million daily”.  The pair also filed another lawsuit shortly after which alleges that new software being developed by Skype incorporated confidential information that was misappropriated by a former executive at one of Friis and Zennstrom’s companies who recently joined Index Ventures, part of the investor group paying $1.9 billion for Skype.

With the benefit of hindsight, many have wondered why eBay would have paid $2.6 billion for Skype without better securing rights to its underlying technology in a manner that would not be interrupted.  While the precise reasons eBay structured the deal in this manner may not be clear, the opportunities it missed to protect itself are apparent.

First, by allowing Joltid to retain rights to the GI code, eBay’s use of the code was subject to the restrictions and limitations that Joltid and Friis and Zennstrom placed on such use as set forth in the license agreement. 

Additionally, without obtaining rights to the source code, eBay was at the mercy of Friis and Zennstrom, the two individuals who understood how the GI code functioned.  While eBay likely felt that having Friis and Zennstrom on its payroll would mitigate any concerns, perhaps additional thought should have been given to what would transpire if and when Friis and Zennstrom were no longer affiliated with eBay.

eBay also apparently did not acquire sufficiently clear rights to develop derivatives and modifications of the GI technology.  Therefore, any next generation versions of the GI technology that eBay wished to develop would have been subject to the restrictions of the original license agreement, including the rights that Joltid, Friis and Zennstrom had in the technology and source code.

While the intrigue and tangled nature of this dispute are in many ways unique, the lesson is clear: the treatment of IP rights in an M&A transaction involves consideration of multiple factors, contingencies and interests.  Careful and deliberate analysis of possible future scenarios–however likely or unlikely–is necessary to avoid losing the competitive advantage that is one of the foundations of the underlying transaction.

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• Late last week,  Judge Louis Stanton of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that plaintiffs in the high-profile copyright class action case against YouTube could not seek statutory damages for videos that are not registered under US copyright law.   Judge Stanton also dismissed plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim, but did permit claims based on live broadcast footage, which were brought by the English Premier Football League, the lead plaintiff in the case, to proceed. 
• After a lengthy battle, record labels and online radio stations reached an agreement on new royalty rates for music streaming.  The new agreement treats web sites differently based on their size and model.  It only applies to sites making most of their money from streaming music, excluding webcasters that run online music services as a small portion of their total business.  Pure-play internet radio providers will have to pay the greater of 25 percent of revenue or a fee each time a listener hears a song.  The new per stream fees start at .08 cent for each song streamed in 2006 and increases to .14 cent in 2015.  Smaller sites will pay 12 to 14 percent of revenue in royalties.  The new agreement replaces a 2007 royalty rate decision. 
• Rosetta Stone, maker of the popular foreign language software programs, filed a trademark infringement suit against Google alleging that its AdWords program, which lets companies buy advertisements that show up as “sponsored links” next to search results, results in consumer confusion.  The complaint alleges that Google is letting companies attach their ads to trademarked words they do not own, as well as allowing companies to use those trademarked terms in the headlines of their ads.  As a result, a search for a trademarked company name may bring up that company, but it may also bring up results for the trademarked company’s competitors.  In recent years Google has been facing other similar lawsuits over its AdWords program but in April, the 2nd Circuit provided trademark owners with some clarity when it held that Google’s use of the trademarks were “acts of commerce”, reversing a trial court’s ruling and permitting trademark owners to proceed with their suits. 

Of course, in the alternative, AT&T claims that to the extent AT&T is not directly liable, secondary liability attaches via the doctrines of inducement, vicarious and contributory liability—essentially, liability for contributing to and benefiting from the unlawful performance of ringtones by AT&T customers. This argument is likely designed to cut against the exemption codified in the Copyright Act allowing the “performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work … to the public without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage… if there is no direct or indirect admission charge.” (see 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)). This would, in theory, prevent ASCAP from proceeding against individual consumers who, although they may be publicly performing a musical work according to Copyright Act, are doing so without commercial advantage and thus not infringing.

ASCAP also reveals in its motion that it has consistently licensed other mobile carriers’ sale and distribution of ringtones, charging “2% of revenue and an alternative usage-based fee calculation.” In fact, ASCAP claims that prior to the Second Circuit’s 2007 decision that digital downloads of sound recordings do not trigger the public performance right (see United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (the “Download Decision”), “very few parties ever questioned or challenged ASCAP on the question of whether ringtones required public performance licenses.”

For business people and transactional lawyers alike, perhaps the most notable takeaway from ASCAP’s motion stems from AT&T’s claim that the ringtone providers (e.g., Jamster, ThumbPlay, etc.), not AT&T, “bear contractual responsibility for securing public performance rights.” In other words, AT&T is stating that if public performance royalties are due, it is the responsibility of content providers, aggregators, and ringtone creators to make payments to the performing rights organizations, not distributors like AT&T and other mobile carriers/network operators. Put simply, this contention highlights the need for parties to these types of agreements to be more explicit than ever about which party will be responsible for performance royalties if and to the extent any public performance rights are implicated. Here, AT&T is pointing the finger at the providers, and to the extent this tactic works, the providers would be responsible for paying royalties based not only on their own revenue, but the mobile carriers’ revenue, which, according to the ASCAP’s standard licensing agreements, is deemed part of the provider’s “client revenue” that is included in the “royalty base” for calculating provider payments to ASCAP. Moreover, any party ultimately saddled with responsibility for making performance payments would not only be required to pay 2% of revenue to ASCAP, but would also be required to remit similar amounts to the two other major performing rights organizations in the U.S. (i.e., BMI, SESAC), raising the total performance royalty rate to more than 6% of revenue–a sizeable payment, and in addition to the mechanical reproduction fees due to those same publishers and writers that are members of the performing rights organizations.

Ultimately, ASCAP, in its attempt to receive royalties from AT&T, devotes the majority of its motion to arguing the extensive nature of ASCAP’s control over the ringtone in an effort to distinguish ringtones from full-audio downloads addressed in the Download Decision, as the outcome of this case may very well turn on the question of the party responsible for triggering the performance. In other words, if an ongoing connection is maintained or required whenever the ringtone is played on a consumer’s phone (e.g., similar to the connection required when a sound recording is streamed over the internet), then the second kind of public performance (i.e., the digital transmission performance) may be triggered. On the other hand, if AT&T can successfully argue that the ringtone is downloaded only once to a consumer’s phone (similar to an iTunes track) without simultaneous or near simultaneous playback and continues to reside on the device exclusively, then merely prompting the playback of same by AT&T for an incoming call should fall more squarely within the confines of the Download Decision.

No matter what side you come down on, ASCAP’s PR machine has been slammed in the past for seeking payment from less than profit driven adversaries, including campfire balladeers such as the Girl Scouts. This time around though, eager to combat a slew of negative news reports trashing ASCAP’s pursuit of ringtone monies, ASCAP moved quickly to address the matter with its own membership, dispatching the following clarification to its writers and composers:

“Bottom line, ASCAP is striving to license those that make a business of transmitting its members’ music. This holds true for any medium where businesses have been built by using this music as content or a service – whether terrestrial broadcast, satellite, cable, Internet or wireless carriers providing audio and video content. To be completely clear, ASCAP’s approach has always been to license these businesses – not to charge listeners/end-users.”

Also, noteworthy in ASCAP’s response, is the fact that ASCAP states that it is “in Federal Rate Court with the two largest U.S. wireless carriers,” evidencing that ASCAP will be staging this battle for ringtone royalties on multiple fronts, including with Verizon, AT&T and possibly ringtone providers supplying the mobile carriers.

Needless to say, this will be a long, hard-fought battle and the public performance organizations, still reeling from the Download Decision (which incidentally is still in the appeals process), will not go quietly when the mobile carriers continue to enjoy revenue in the billions from the sale of ringtones. As always, we will continue to closely monitor this case given the potential impact on our clients’ businesses and the need for licensing and distribution contracts that accurately delineate each party’s roles and responsibilities in this constantly evolving digital space.

Tomorrow a Swedish court is expected to announce it’s ruling in a criminal case that has been closely watched by nearly everyone with a stake-financial or otherwise-in the free-wheeling world of P2P file swapping.  At its core, the ruling will determine whether the operators of the Pirate Bay, the popular torrent search and indexing site, are guilty of violating Sweden’s copyright law.  A conviction-which many observers expect-could lead to imprisonment and a possible fine, as well as a shut-down of the site.  However, despite the potential immediate impact on the Pirate Bay and its operators, the broader implications of a guilty verdict, including whether or not it will serve as a deterrent against unauthorized file-sharing, are a little less certain.

For the uninitiated, a little background:  the Pirate Bay is a Swedish web site that bills itself as the world’s largest BitTorrent tracker.  According to various measurements, the site ranked 105th for daily traffic over the past three months and an estimated 2.7 million people from the US visit every month.  

BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol used to transfer files, which accounts for approximately 35% of all traffic on the Internet according to one study.  BitTorrent differs from traditional P2P file-sharing in that a single file may be downloaded from numerous sources, each providing small packets of data, rather than from a single source.  A client implementing the protocol creates a small file called a “torrent” which contains metadata about the files to be shared and about a tracker computer that coordinates file distribution.  A user seeking to download the file must first obtain the torrent file associated with it and connect to the tracker computer, which then tells the user’s computer which other computers on the network have pieces of the file to be downloaded.

The defendants in the Pirate Bay case are relying on the underlying nature of the BitTorrent protocol to serve as the basis for their defense.  Specifically, they claim that since the Pirate Bay website only serves as an index for torrent files, and does not actually store any copyrighted materials, the site’s operations cannot be deemed to be infringing.  Taking the argument a bit further, they claim that because many sites and services on the Web point to or link to infringing content or allow users to upload such content-including Google-the infrastructure and inherent nature of the Internet are at issue in the case.  The defendants used the analogy of roads and telephones that sometimes are used for illegal activities: no one suggests destroying the road network or hauling phone companies into court due to offenses committed by one or more individuals using such roads or telephones.

Prosecutors countered that search services like Google, and the roads and telephone lines, were established to foster legal activities.  In contrast, the Pirate Bay’s entire raison d’être appears to be to foster primarily illegal activity in the form of infringing file-sharing. 

The trial itself, which was held over three weeks in February and March, was a bit of circus.  The defendants and their supporters posted daily accounts of the trial on the Web.  And, after the web site of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, the trade group for the music industry, was hacked during the trial, one of the defendants posted a note on his Twitter account saying, “Whoever is hacking the IFPI websites, please stop doing that.  It only makes us look bad!”

In many ways, the Pirate Bay’s notoriety is an “only in Sweden” affair.  Until recent amendments, the Swedish copyright law did not prohibit downloading copyrighted material for personal use.  Nearly every Swedish household has a cheap broadband connection, and polls have found that over 10% of the population engaged in some sort of P2P file-sharing and downloading.  A political party dedicated to legalizing P2P file sharing-regardless of copyright issues-was formed and has made credible efforts to gain seats in the Swedish Parliament.

However, in response to international pressure, the Swedish government has begun to take a tougher stance against illegal file-sharing.  Earlier this month, a law came into effect allowing content owners to obtain from Swedish ISPs the names and addresses of people suspected of sharing copyrighted materials without authorization.  The law, which brings to Sweden an investigation and enforcement tool available throughout the EU, had an immediate impact. On the day the law went into effect, total Internet usage decreased by 40% and has remained suppressed since such time.

During the trial, the head of the IFPI testified that 30% of the losses suffered by the global music industry were a result of illegal file sharing, citing several academic papers.  He also testified that, following successful court actions in recent years which led to the shut-down of P2P file-sharing sites Grokster and Kazaa, the Pirate Bay had become the No. 1 source for illegal music on the Web. 

Despite the fact that early in the trial prosecutors dropped charges alleging that the operators were “assisting copyright infringement”-leaving the primary allegation based on “assisting in making available” copyrighted material-it appears that the prosecution will ultimately prevail. 

However, it is unclear what impact, if any, shutting down the Pirate Bay will have on illegal file-sharing as a whole.  As has been seen numerous times over the past decade, every time a prominent P2P site or service has been successfully challenged and shut down (see Napster, Kazaa, Grokster, etc.), downloaders have simply found other sites to use.  Moreover, the Pirate Bay is merely one of many BitTorrent search and tracking services currently available to end users, including Mininova, isoHunt and btjunkie.  (Ironically, while none of these sites have become a high-profile target of the entertainment industry, Mininova actually has a higher traffic ranking than the Pirate Bay (86^th v. 105^th).  And the others aren’t shy about self-promotion:  isoHunt says it is the “most comprehensive BitTorrent search engine”; and btjunkie bills itself as “the largest and most advanced BitTorrent search engine” with over 1.5 million active torrents.)  [As an aside, in researching the information above and merely visiting the home pages of those sites via Google links, the PC we were using was apparently infected with a virus (notwithstanding the fairly extensive systems in place here).  Perhaps the media industry's strategy vis a vis these sites is based on its awareness of this "deterrent" we unwittingly and regretfully stumbled upon.]

However, in light of the brazen attitude that the Pirate Bay’s operators have taken toward illegal file-sharing, a conviction will enable the entertainment industry to claim a major victory in its fight against Internet piracy.

Regardless of the outcome, the trial-and similar enforcement efforts-should not be viewed by the entertainment and media industry as a substitute for a viable P2P business strategy.  Current and future technologies are making the digital distribution of music, video and book files faster, simpler and more ubiquitous.  Initiatives such as collective licensing-under which ISPs would pay an independent agency a fee based on its user base (presumably passed on as a fee to the users), which would in turn be pooled by the agency and used to pay royalties to content owners-are being considered viable alternatives that may effectively compensate content owners, foster the wide distribution of entertainment assets and move the digital space to a less adversarial environment.

The protected work at issue in Capcom Co. v. The MKR Group Ltd. was George A. Romero’s Dawn of the Dead, a film about a small group of people who are trapped in a shopping mall overrun by zombies.  Dead Rising is a video game that shares the same basic premise and many of the same details.  Both works are set in rural towns and feature protagonists who are tough, cynical journalists with short brown hair and a leather jacket.  Similarly, in both works, the protagonist arrives by helicopter and survives by utilizing food and weapons located inside the mall.  The game even shares the film’s unexplained tendency to dress an inordinate number of zombies in plaid shirts.  Gamedaily, a popular website that reviews video games, even commented that “Dead Rising is about as close as you’ll probably get to being a part of George Romero’s film, Dawn of the Dead.” 

A cynic might conclude that Capcom, the company that created Dead Rising, was attempting to cater to the Dawn of the Dead fan base by capturing the movie experience and presenting it in video game form.  In fact, as noted in the decision, Capcom approached MKR Group, the owners of the rights to Dawn of the Dead, to enquire about licensing the film’s elements for the video game.  It is unclear why no agreement was ever reached but Capcom went ahead with the release and took the somewhat unusual step of placing a disclaimer on the box stating that “THIS GAME WAS NOT DEVELOPED, APPROVED OR LICENSED BY THE OWNERS OF GEORGE AV. ROMERO’S DAWN OF THE DEAD TM.”  However, this strategy also came with certain risks. 

Recognizing the potential for litigation, Capcom sought a declaratory judgment that no copyright infringement had taken place, arguing that the differences between the two works far outweigh the similarities.  MKR Group countered by alleging copyright infringement. 

To succeed on its claim, MKR Group would have had to show that Dawn of the Dead and Dead Rising were “substantially similar” in their “protected elements.”  To meet this standard, the Ninth Circuit requires that the copyright holder satisfy both an “intrinsic test” and an “extrinsic test.”  The “intrinsic test” examines an ordinary person’s subjective impressions of the similarities between the two works and is exclusively within the province of the jury.  When a court finds that the claim fails the “extrinsic test,” as was the case here, it is dismissed before the jury is faced with this inquiry.

The “extrinsic test” is described as an “objective” test of similarity in the “expression of protectable ideas.”  To simplify this abstract legal concept, courts generally require that similar elements be present and that these elements be “expressed” in analogous ways.  If similarities exist but are outweighed by accompanying differences, this standard is not met.  This is a difficult standard for copyright holders, as evidenced by this case. 

In ruling in favor of Capcom, the court identified several differences between the game and film.  For example, with regard to plot, the court noted that the helicopter rides occur at different points in each story.  Similarly, the journalist in Dawn of the Dead is middle-aged and non-athletic, while his counterpart in Dead Rising is young and physically fit.  The two characters also possess contrasting personalities.  Furthermore, the game lacked anti-consumerism themes present in the film and proceeded at a faster pace.  Differences in dialogue, mood and setting were also noted.  Distinctions such as these were sufficient to defeat the infringement claim.  In contrast, the district court viewed the parallels between the game and film as a “string of disconnected facts.”

Copyright infringement cases are always fact-specific.  It is therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions about how this case might impact other situations involving video games containing themes and plot lines that resemble films or other dramatic works.  However, because of the uncertainty facing both game developers and publishers like Capcom-which was concerned enough about the case to take the pre-emptive step of a declaratory judgment action-and film owners, these parties should carefully evaluate possible infringement claims.  They also may want to explore entering into licensing agreements that will provide the certainty of an agreed-upon royalty scheme and provisions related to the scope and use of the licensed property, rather than risk, cost and uncertainty of litigation.